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Falkland Islands
By Colin King [ Fenix Insight Ltd. ]
Background
Throughout the eleven-year mine clearance program in the Falkland 
Islands, the exploitation (disassembly, detailed analysis, and testing) of 
live mines was a regular feature. In addition to assessing the condi-
tion of the mines in order to optimize the safety and efficiency of the 
clearance process, there was intense interest in the subject of long-term 
residual risk. 
The rigorous demining program was highly successful, and the 
Falkland Islands have now been declared clear. However, a mine 
recently washed up on the shore near the Capital, Stanley, and it’s pos-
sible that others will do so over the next few years. It is also clear that 
findings from exploitation work in the Falkland Islands can make a 
significant contribution to the understanding of residual risk in other 
mine-affected regions.
During the final phases of the program, the discovery of Israeli 
No. 4 anti-personnel (AP) mines triggered a request from SafeLane 
Global, the land release contractor (LRC) and Demining Programme 
Office (DPO) for a technical assessment of their condition. Initially, 
this took the form of a remote desktop study based on images of 
recovered mines, which were compared to inert examples and techni-
cal data held by Fenix Insight Ltd. The aim was to consider the likely 
effects of ageing and their implications for the handling and disposal 
of the mines.
Soon after, the LRC also began to encounter Argentinian M1 and 
Israeli No. 6 anti-tank (AT) mines, as well as Argentinian FMK-1 AP 
mines. Once again, as the clearance program entered its final phase, 
questions of residual risk, handling, and disposal were raised, and an 
exploitation visit was planned in order to assess
• the general condition of the mines
• the functionality of fuzing mechanisms
• the viability of energetic materials
• the implications of changes for risk
The work was conducted in March 2019 by Colin King, Technical 
Director of Fenix Insight Ltd, assisted by Max Grace, Fenix Operations 
Assistant, and supported by Guy Marot, who ran the DPO. 
Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is always a fundamental part of the planning pro-
cess and follows a well-established Fenix protocol. It considers the like-
lihood and potential consequence of each hazard in order to allocate a 
combined risk score, often involving multiple team members in order 
to capture technical and procedural considerations across a range of 
Logistics
scenarios. Where appropriate, controls are then applied to manage the 
risk to make it as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). 
Previous deployments have illustrated the value of this process 
when, for example, the worst-case scenario of a firing pin remaining 
lodged in a live detonator was found to have occurred in several mines.
A temporary ammunition processing building (APB) was set up at 
Yorke Bay, outside Stanley, in a shipping container with a workbench 
and vice, a generator, and lighting. A specialist tool kit was brought 
from the United Kingdom to supplement the tools and equipment 
retained from previous exploitation phases; this included jigs built 
by Fenix for the disassembly of machine-assembled mines. The only 
power tools were a large commercial band saw and a cordless drill.
Image 1. An open bunker 
area containing a variety of 
live AP and AT mines. 
All graphics courtesy of the author.
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Image 2. The APB was established in a shipping container, 
placed among the sand dunes of Yorke Bay, near the capital, 
Stanley.
Image 3. A simple work station was set up, with specialist tools 
and disassembly jigs brought from the United Kingdom. 
Mines, recovered by the LRC during clearance operations were 
retained in open sandbag bunkers within the minefield fences and 
therefore well away from public access. Their continued exposure to 
the weather meant that mines were not subjected to artificially dry 
Methodology
The workflow followed a standard Fenix process map for exploita-
tion activity. For each mine type, this involved full disassembly and 
examination of critical components. In order to assess the capability 
of a mine to operate as designed, the three main areas of interest were:
•  the integrity of the casing
• the functionality of the fuzing mechanism 
• the viability of the explosive compositions
It is well established that secondary high explosives such as TNT 
remain capable of detonation for many years; this is illustrated by the 
continuing viability of ammunition from World War I after more than 
a century. Since the main charge is almost always found intact, the 
key element in the explosive train is the detonator. No matter what 
Findings
Throughout the studies on the ageing of mines, the ingress of water 
has been established as the greatest single influence on the degradation 
of internal components. This in turn means that the integrity of the 
casing (its ability to remain waterproof) is important. The mines that 
were present in the Falkland Islands included significantly different 
designs and materials. Some of the plastic casings proved extremely 
robust, yet others had degraded badly. Some steel casings had thick 
external rust but still retained their integrity beneath, while a well-
sealed fuze body effectively acts as a separate casing within a casing. 
The vulnerability of internal components also varies substantially. 
Some fuzing mechanisms incorporate virtually impervious plastics 
and stainless steels, while others contain components made from 
rust-prone iron and mild steel. Explosive initiators also vary in design 
and vulnerability, some being seriously degraded by small amounts 
of salt water. 
Previous phases of exploitation focused mainly on the plastic-
cased mines encountered inland (SB-33, SB-81, P4B, and C3B), 
with findings suggesting that the entire population of mines in the 
Falkland Islands might be nearing the end of its operational life. 
However, the examination of four additional mine types (FMK-1, 
M1, No. 4, and No. 6) from coastal areas casts doubt on that conclu-
sion, with all of these found to pose a continuing risk during the 
final stages of clearance. Additionally, unlike those seen previously, 
the SB-33 mines examined here showed no indication that they were 
nearing the ends of their operational lives.
A constant worry in old munitions is the interaction of primary 
explosives with some metals to form highly sensitive compounds. 
Fortunately, most mines of the types that were present in the Falkland 
Islands use aluminum or plastic detonator capsules, and there is no 
evidence that this is a problem.
conditions that might have altered their state. The M1, No. 6, and No. 
4 mines had been dug up in sand and processed through the sifting 
system; they had therefore been subjected to significant disturbance, 
possibly including substantial pressure and vibration.
the condition of the body, the fuze mechanism, or the main charge, 
a mine is incapable of functioning as designed unless the detonator 
is serviceable. The testing of detonators was therefore critical to the 
real-world evaluation of the risk posed by these mines during the final 
stages of clearance, and for the prediction of long-term residual risk 
in other regions. 
A simple rig was improvised to allow a spring-loaded striker to be 
released from behind the cover of the shipping container, while the 
test was captured on video. The initiation mechanism was improvised 
from a recovered No. 4 mine fuze, with the components restored to 
full functionality and checked before each operation. 
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Image 6. The heavily rusted casing of the Israeli No. 6 AT mine.
Image 7. A section through the No. 6 mine reveals that, much 
like the No. 4, the fuze is partially seized but the explosive train 
remains functional.
Image 8. A disassembled Italian SB-33 mine, showing most 
components in good condition. 
Image 9. Most of the M1 mines were heavily rusted.
Image 5. A section through the Israeli No. 4 mine. The 
fuze striker is partially seized, but the explosive train is still 
functional. 
Image 4. A section through the Argentinian FMK-1 shows that 
the casing, charge, and fuzing components are in excellent 
condition. 
The only consistent theme is the condition of the secondary explo-
sive where, as expected, all of the main charges and boosters remained 
functional. In general, the risk from this bulk energetic material is 
only significant if an operational initiation train is also present. It’s 
not that this secondary explosive is safe, since it clearly retains the 
potential to cause accidents if mistreated, but detonation requires a 
level of energy input well beyond those involved in everyday events, 
such as bonfires or digging.
Quite often with aged ammunition, what you see is what you get; if 
it looks badly degraded then generally it is. But nothing better illus-
trates the need for exploitation, or the potential for counter-intuitive 
findings, than the Italian SB-81 and Argentinian M1 AT mines. Most 
of the SB-81 mines looked almost factory-fresh, while the M1 mines 
were heavily rusted and sometimes barely recognizable. However, the 
SB-81 striker springs were heavily corroded, and the detonators’ stab-
receptors were non-functional, rendering the mines incapable of oper-
ating as designed. 
Meanwhile, underneath layers of rust, the M1 casings were largely 
intact, firmly encapsulating robust TNT charges. The M1 fuze has a 
heavy brass body, offering complete protection to the mechanical 
and energetic components within. Testing the detonator established 
beyond doubt that these mines were fully capable of functioning.
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Key Conclusions on Residual Risk
The variety of designs and materials means that each mine compo-
nent has its own level of vulnerability, combining to incline the entire 
mine towards resilience or susceptibility. The failure of one key com-
ponent will usually prevent the mine from functioning as designed; 
however, the simultaneous failure of two key features adds a signifi-
cant level of confidence, particularly if one failure relates to the fuzing 
mechanism, and the other is within the explosive train. This is the case 
for the SB-81 and C3B AT mines, which are the only two types that 
have washed ashore. Should this occur again, there is a high degree of 
confidence that these mines would not be operational.
The nature of the environmental influences is also important, 
accepting that the micro-climate in which mines are located may vary 
significantly, even if they are close together. For example, one mine 
may be partially buried in very wet ground, while another nearby may 
rest on the surface of well-drained soil but be exposed to sunlight.
Image 10. Detonators from the SB-33 mines appeared 
virtually as-new, and were fully functional.
Image 11. Externally, most SB-81 mines appeared to be in 
excellent condition. 
Image 12. The SB-81 striker springs had rusted away.
Image 13. The stab-receptors of the SB-81 detonators were no 
longer functional.
The presence of sand and salt water added further ageing influences 
to those present inland, with sand having abrasive effects and block-
ing mechanisms, and salt water being more corrosive. This means that 
mines in coastal areas should deteriorate faster than similar types 
located inland, but this was not always found to be the case. P4B and 
SB-81 mines were definitely in worse condition than those recovered 
inland, yet the Italian SB-33 AP mines were better, possibly reflecting 
tighter insertion of the detonator plug to seal the mines. 
Table 1 summarizes the findings and conclusions from the exploita-
tion of mines recovered in and around coastal areas in the Falkland 
Islands as the clearance program neared conclusion. The findings 
might apply to these mine types in similar environments, if they were 
to be encountered in other regions.
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Recommendations
The results of the exploitation work were briefed to the demining 
team leaders and management, and a number of recommendations 
were made. In particular, it was recommended that the LRC consider 
the potential risk of initiation during the excavation or sifting process 
with the M1 and No. 6 AT mines. They were also warned of the pos-
sibility of sensitization during these processes, which could substan-
tially lower the operating threshold, and to therefore apply appropriate 
Conclusion
Designation Technical findings Conclusion
FMK-1 Resilient casing resulting in the fuzing mechanism and 
explosive train being well preserved.
These mines could have remained functional for many 
years.
“M1” Fuzing mechanism and explosive train remain well pre-
served, despite heavily degraded external appearance.
Some mines were still fully functional.
SB-33 Mines in good condition, with fuzing mechanism and 
explosive train (particularly detonators) very well pre-
served.
These mines could have remained functional for many 
years.
No. 4 Fuzing mechanisms complete but seized. Explosive 
trains intact, with some detonators found to be func-
tional.
Incapable of operating as designed. However, the pres-
ence of complete mechanical and explosive systems 
carried the risk of unintended initiation mechanisms.
No. 6 Fuzing mechanisms complete but seized. Explosive 
trains intact, with the possibility that some detonators 
may remain functional.
Potentially capable of operation if subjected to sub-
stantial pressure or shock—could have been sensitized 
during extraction.
P4B Loss of structural integrity, allowing ingress of water. 
Fuzing mechanisms incomplete due to rusting of the 
striker spring. Detonators unlikely to function.
Two or more points of failure mean that these mines 
were unlikely to operate.
SB-81 Fuzing mechanisms incomplete due to rusting of the 
striker spring. Detonators unlikely to function.
Two points of failure mean that these mines were 
unlikely to operate. 
Table 1.
additional control measures. As a result of these findings, appropriate 
adjustments to operating procedures were implemented.
Following the end of the clearance program, it was also recom-
mended that awareness messages and education on residual risks 
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BIOGRAPHY
Inevitably, mine populations will continue to degrade to the point 
where all eventually become safe. However, where previous studies 
indicated that this state might be achieved relatively soon, findings 
from this recent work suggest that some mine types can remain func-
tional for many years, even in the harshest environments.
This conclusion, along with some of the surprising and counter-
intuitive technical findings, reinforces the need for exploitation work 
to provide a sound foundation for evidence-based decision-making. 
The global issue of residual risk from landmines is simply too impor-
tant to be based on assumption or myth. 
Quite often with aged ammunition, what you see is what you get; 
if it looks badly degraded then generally it is.
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